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Along with the development of the athletics’ globalization, marketization and 
commercialization, sport plays a more and more important role in our life. When the sports Industry 
grows under a high-speed, serious judge problems break out in many league matches, which 
obstructs the healthy running of sports market. Among all the judge problems, "black whistle" is a 
typical example. “Black whistle storm” and "telephone gate" aroused wide concern. In 2005, FIFA 
hold a conference to discuss on "black whistle" in Zurich. However, “judge’s hidden rules” which 
derive from "black whistle" are ignored. What are called “judge’s hidden rules” mean that clubs 
need to pay judge of the match for fair judgment, which is deemed as rule in this zone. 
In real life, some gray districts exist in realms of social economy, kinds of "hidden rules" 
spread, so that the relationship between "explicit rules" and "hidden rules" become strained. 
“Judge’s hidden rules” which come from the development of sports business are parts of the 
"hidden rules" in society. How these “hidden rules” are created and developed? What about their 
efficiency? These problems are worth to be researched. 
This thesis tries to reveal these problems through the study of “judge’s hidden rules”. First of 
all, the creation and evolution of “judge’s hidden rules” are studied with game theory. On that basis, 
we discuss on the efficiency of “judge’s hidden rules”. This thesis suggests efficiency criteria: 
efficiency of institution itself & influence to the social economy. Efficiency of institution itself is 
cost-benefit analysis on institution operation. Influence to the social economy focus on the problem 
whether the institution improve or handicap the economic development. From these criteria, we 
come to a conclusion that “judge’s hidden rules” is inefficiency. Finally, this thesis discusses on 
disposal of “judge’s hidden rules” and gives some advices. Furthermore, we try to find the most 
efficient policy portfolio. 
Generally, this thesis is divided into four parts. Chapter 1 is introduction. In this part, we 
summarize research backgrounds and significances; review the current situation of the correlational 
research; introduce research method and framework. In chapter 2, the creation and evolution of 
“judge’s hidden rules” are studied. In chapter3, the efficiency of “judge’s hidden rules” is 
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